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Abstract  
Corporate governance has come to the forefront of academic research due to the vital role it plays in the overall 
health of economic systems. The wave of U.S. corporate fraud in the 1990s was attributed to deficiencies in 
corporate governance. The recent 2008-2009 global financial crisis, triggered by the unprecedented failure of 
Lehman Brothers and the subprime mortgage problems, renewed interest in the role corporate governance plays 
in the financial sector. The development of a strong corporate governance framework is important to protect 
stakeholders, maintain investor confidence in the transition countries and attract foreign direct investment. This 
paper looks at the role of corporate governance in European transition countries in their transformation to a 
market economy. Corporate governance has come to the forefront of academic research due to the vital role it 
plays in the overall health of economic systems. The wave of U.S. corporate fraud in the 1990s was attributed to 
deficiencies in corporate governance. The recent 2008-2009 global financial crisis, triggered by the 
unprecedented failure of Lehman Brothers and the subprime mortgage problems, renewed interest in the role 
corporate governance plays in the financial sector. The development of a strong corporate governance 
framework is important to protect stakeholders, maintain investor confidence in the transition countries and 
attract foreign direct investment.  The paper compares the different levels of corporate governance established 
among the transition countries.  
Keywords: corporate governance, transition countries, emerging economies, corporate governance, responsible 
corporate governance etc.  
 
1. Introduction 
The transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have privatized their economies at an unprecendented 
speed in the 1990s. The expectation was that under private ownership, for merly state-owned firms would act as 
dynamic, profit oriented players driving economic restructuring and growth. Yet, the expectation has rarely been 
fulfilled, and lack of effective corporate governance is often seen as a culprit.  
A strong corporate governance foundation is important for a growing market economy. It has to include 
the integrity and transparency of financial and corporate operations, checks and balances in compliance with 
applicable laws, the practices of sound financial and corporate operations and accounting practices that are in 
accordance with international standards. In the legal sector, laws that are enacted must be timely and consistently 
enforced. The laws must be clear and consistent: in areas of orderly entry and exit of firms, property and asset 
protection of investors and transparency of the legal system. Establishing effective corporate governance is of 
particular importance for transition countries because its success is crucial not only for the growth of a healthy 
corporate sector but also for sustaining a healthy market economy. Bekaert et al (2001) find that the 
liberalization of financial markets in transition countries increases economic growth by about 2 percentage 
points per year. Some countries like Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia have very low effective corporate 
governance with high incidences of corruption and fraud in the political and economic systems. Other countries 
like Poland, Hungary and Latvia have established relatively effective corporate governance with greater 
achievements made toward market-based economies 
“Corporate governance” comprises a country’s private and public institutions, both formal and 
informal, which together govern the relationship between the people who manage corporations (“corporate 
insiders”) and all others who invest resources in corporations in the country. These institutions notably include 
the country’s corporate laws, securities laws, accounting rules, generally accepted business practices and 
prevailing business ethics.  
 
2. The Sources of Corporate Governance 
The process of identifying definitions for the concept of corporate governance facilitates the  understanding of 
differences between views regarding the content of this concept. The first attempt  to explain the concept of 
corporate governance belongs to Berle and Means (1932) who consider  that corporate responsibility refers to the 
"equitable control" that managers must exert to meet the interests of shareholders.  A widely used definition 
belongs to the Cadbury Committee (Mallin, 2007): "the system by  which companies are directed and controlled". 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997)  approach corporate  governance while having in mind the means by which "resource 
providers" and financial investors ensure the profitability of their investments. Corporate governance can mean: 
„leadership,  organizational structures and processes that help ensure that an organization’s functions sustain and  
extend its strategies and objectives. Put more simply, it is the culture, policies, procedures and  controls that help 
ensure a company will meet its business goals.” (Lamm, 2010a), "a system of  rules and norms, of either 
institutional or market nature, within which various categories of  stakeholders, shareholders, management, 
public administration, staff, customers, suppliers, etc.  arise or develop" (Bostan and  Bostan, 2010), "a concept 
that  encompasses a wide range of  activities, rules, processes and procedures designed to ensure optimal use of 
resources and corporate  strategies in order to meet its objectives " (Dobroţeanu et al., 2011). 
The development of the concept of corporate  governance was made in connection with a  number of 
theories. The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) dominates other theoretical  approaches of corporate 
governance and extends the basis theory on the separation of ownership  from control, analysing the 
relationships between those who delegate authority (shareholders) and  those who perform services to the benefit 
of the  former (CEOs), as a consequence of information  asymmetry. Recent research demonstrates the 
implications of transaction costs on resource  allocation and on the structure of organizations (Iacobuţă and 
Frunză, 2006). Transaction cost  theory states that the transaction is the basic unit of analysis in economics; 
economic governance is  essential to optimizing resource allocation and increasing economic efficiency 
(Williamson, 1975).  
Stewardship theory shows that managers, as administrators of the business, are inclined to meet the  
interests of shareholders. This theory (Donaldson, 1990) eliminates the idea of personal interests,  arguing that 
variations in performance obtained by managers are determined by their position.  
Stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) provides a legal framework for the inclusion of  
stakeholders in the managerial decision-making  process (Crane and Ruebottom, 2011). The main  goal of 
management should be to create value and satisfaction for all stakeholders (Aggarwal and  Chandra, 1990; 
Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000). In this context, some research sought to analyse the  topic of shareholder value 
versus stakeholder orientation based on  empirical studies of managers  from top U.S., UK and European 
companies (Stadler et al., 2006). 
A series of corporate governance models have been individualised in scholarly literature.  Albert (1993) 
distinguishes two models of corporate governance: shareholder value model (AngloSaxon model) and 
stakeholders model (Rhineland model). De Jong (1997) considers that there are  three alternative models of 
corporate governance: American (Anglo-Saxon or market-oriented  system), continental (Germanic or network-
oriented system) and Latin (represented by companies  from Italy, France, Spain, etc.). Yoshimori (1995) 
believes that we can identify three distinct  concepts related to corporate governance: "monistic, dualistic  and 
pluralistic". In another vision  (Bostan and Bostan, 2010), the two models of corporate governance are: the 
“insider system” model  and the “outsider system” model. 
 
3. Corporate Governance in Transition Countries 
 The difference in the corporate governance problem in transition countries is one of controlling versus minority 
shareholders problem. The early privatization of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resulted in mostly 
concentrated ownership by dominant or block- shareholders, (institutional investors - Hungary, management 
buyout (MBOs) or management-employee buyouts (MEBOs) - Poland, employee-owners – Czech), giving these 
controlling shareholders considerable greater control over corporate assets than their stock ownership warranted. 
Of even greater concern than the concentrated ownership is the prevalence of complex ownership structures 
through cross-shareholdings, multiple-class shareholdings with different voting rights, pyramidal corporate 
shareholdings. A landmark study by Bebchuk et al (1999) shows that “expropriation costs” are very large when 
such complex shareholdings are used to increase control rights beyond their cash- flow rights, even larger than 
concentrated ownerships.  The role of corporate governance to under girth weak competitive market mechanisms 
and democratic political institutions is the complementing factor necessary to sustain the long-term 
modernization of the transition countries. In other words, the “principal- agent” relationship that governs most 
capitalist societies that provides the incentives and environment in which investors (principals) can reap the 
profits of their investment through their corporations (agents) and the behavioral relationship are determined by a 
set of corporate governance standards. EBRD’s Legal Indicator Surveys reports that transition countries have an 
implementation gap between the enactment of laws and its enforcement. Unlike developed countries in the 
United States and United Kingdom with widely dispersed shareholders, the principal-agent corporate governance 
problems are primarily due to the agent (manager) perpetrating embezzlement and fraud. The corporate 
governance regime of the English legal origins (US-UK) emphasizes the protection of shareholders from being 
expropriated by the firm’s management. In contrast, the European legal origin countries (French-German) 
emphasize the protection of stakeholders (state, blockholders, employees) from expropriation. A relationship-
based system and investor expropriation tends to prevail in emerging economies. In Russia, Bulgaria and 
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elsewhere mass privatization enriched the oligarchs and the politically well connected. The “cronyism” and 
relationship-based structure carried over from the communist era with most of the post - communist corporate 
owners part of the politically connected or political elite is difficult to root out. The lack of effective corporate 
governance, in particular, Russia, engenders a hostile business environment : corruption, organized crime, a bias 
judicial system and government interference. In the post-socialist European countries, the set of corporate 
governance standards adopted varies which may depend on past legal heritage. The group of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Baltic (CEEB) nations has a German legal heritage which includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The group of South East 
European (SEE) nations has a French legal heritage which includes the Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bosnia 
and Albania. The last group consists of most of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Pistor (2000) 
finds that past legal heritage is not significant in explaining what predominant system of legal structure will be 
adopted by the transition countries. Rather, the adoption during the initial transformation period is driven more 
by the desire to converge with the EU legal system with an eye to attaining accession or the US system. Pistor 
also observes that differences in legal reforms among the transition countries are due primarily to policy makers 
responding to economic changes : greater privatization engenders better protection of creditor’s and 
stockholder’s rights or whether the dominant external advisors are from the US or EU. Mahoney (2001) similarly 
argues that a nation directly or indirectly adopts a set of legal structure in response to change rather than solely 
because of its past legal heritage. Poland and the Czech Republic are good examples of differences in 
privatization, corporate governance development and economic growth. An interesting study by Coffee (1999) 
compares the differences between Poland and the Czech Republic experience. Both countries adopted corporate 
law system based on the German civil law heritage. The important difference is that despite the German heritage, 
Poland’s securities regulations and practices follow the common law system of the Anglo-American more 
closely : greater private ownership protection, stringent disclosure standards and a strong enforcing securities 
commission agency. Coffee concludes (1) that better securities regulation to protect minority shareholders from 
expropriation is more effective than ineffective corporate laws, (2) that the Anglo-American common laws 
structure of corporate governance outperforms the German - French civil law structure despite their legal 
heritage. The result is the successful growth of equity financing for businesses in Poland with a growing healthy 
growing stock market. The Polish stock market is one of the largest among the transition countries with a market 
capitalization of U$175.85 billion in 2010; in contrast, the Czech Republic stock market capitalization is only 
U$68,831.   
 
4. Stages of Market Transformation  
Transition economies are former centrally planned economies undergoing unprecedented, comprehensive 
transformations to market-driven economies (World Bank,2002). Planned and market economies are opposing 
economic systems adhering to different institutional frameworks (King, 2001; Martin,2002; Peng,2003; 
Williamson,1995). An institutional framework is a set of formal constraints such as legal and regulative systems; 
and informal constraints such as social values, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions that 
regulate human behavior and economic activity (e.g.,the use of norms of trade associations to regulate 
exchanges; social pressure to ensure that parties perform their duties) (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). The 
institutional framework associated with a centrally planned economy, which we label the bureaucratic control 
institutional framework, principally underlies public ownership, state coordination, redistribution, and control 
(Boisot & Child, 1988;Kornai,1990). The institutional framework associated with a market economy (market 
institutional framework) principally underlies private ownership and market transactions (Kornai, 1990; 
Williamson,1995).  
Institutional theorists assert that the replacement of an institutional framework with a new one often 
occurs in three stages: dominance of the old framework, emergence of an interim framework with some elements 
of both frameworks, and finally prevalence of a new framework (Benson,1977; Gerry, 2000; Lachmann,1979; 
North,1990). We suggest transformation from bureaucratic control to the market institutional framework is likely 
to go through an interim (intermediate) stage, during which the formal rules associated with the centrally planned 
system weaken rapidly. The new market rules evolve slowly, forcing various constituents to rely on informal 
constraints (Lachmann,1979; McMillan & Woodruff,2000; Peng,2003; Peng & Heath,1996). The intermediate 
period therefore can be defined as the relational stage dominated by a relational institutional framework 
(Peng,2003). Although one institutional framework is dominant in a particular stage, the three institutional 
frameworks tend to coexist during the transition process, and together constitute a larger societal institutional 
environment (Benson,1977; North,1990).  
Extant literature on transition economies documents the existence of three stages. The factors inherent 
in the bureaucratic control stage (i.e., state ownership, intervention, and redistribution) have been reported in 
various studies (e.g.,Andreff,1999; King,2001; Kornai,1990; McCarthy & Puffer,2003; Stark, 1994; 
Suhomlinova,1999). Andreff (1999) showed that in 1995, after six years of transition, the average state 
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ownership in former socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe was 58 percent; among them the Czech 
Republic had the lowest level of state ownership (31%), and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan had the highest (85%). 
The existence of a relational stage is also well documented (e.g., King,2001; McMillan & Woodruff, 2000; 
Peng,2003; Peng & Heath,1996). These studies have demonstrated that widespread, relationship-based exchange 
tends to emerge systematically in transition economies due to the absence of formal, market-based laws and 
regulations. Finally, some transition economies (e.g., those of the Czech Republic and Poland) have now 
progressed to the late stage of transition as they now have an advanced market institutional framework (Tihanyi 
& Roath,2002).  
We do not focus on the investigation of how transition economies progress. Instead, we assume 
transition economies are committed to transforming to a market economy and are likely to go through the three 
stages we specify. We believe that bracketing the transition process into different stages with fairly distinct 
institutional trajectories is useful in examining the impact of institutions and institutional changes on corporate 
governance in transition economies.  
 
5. Towards responsible corporate governance. 
According to traditional understanding, corporate governance practices may be involved in societal activity 
provided that they are fully voluntary and result in a positive contribution to profit. Only for this reason, 
directors are informed  about environmental risks, liabilities and key environmental compliance issues the 
company may be facing (Kuhndt et al., 2004). Starting from this idea, the corporate boards are believed to be 
accountable only to their shareholders and to no other group in society. Hence, the board is answerable to 
shareholders and, in some systems, to employees and creditors. Recently, a new approach to corporate 
governance has been developed which relies on the assumption that man is free and responsible (Aras and 
Crowther, 2010). On this basis, corporations are viewed as communities of free and responsible persons engaged 
in a creative project, able to contribute to the common good. The terms "good corporate governance" or 
"responsible corporate governance" are used ever more often in scholarly literature. Bad governance is being 
increasingly regarded as one of the underlying causes of all evil in our societies (Shil, 2008). Good corporate 
governance is a must in ensuring the values required by different stakeholder groups. It enhances the 
performance of corporations,  by creating an environment that motivates managers to maximize return on 
investment, enhances operational efficiency and ensures long–term productivity growth. Consequently, such 
corporations attract the best talent available on a global scale. It also ensures the alignment of corporations to the 
interests of investors and society, by creating fairness, transparency and accountability in business activities 
among employees, management and the board (Oman, 2001). Good corporate governance in a corporate set up 
leads to legal maximization of shareholders’ value, in an ethical and sustainable manner, while ensuring equity 
and transparency to every stakeholder – customers, employees, investors, vendor-partners, government, and 
community (Murthy, 2006). Another aspect of stakeholder empowered corporate governance is  the development 
of  “Leadership for Responsibility”. This refers to utilising the resources of corporations to bring about societal 
change. A leader in responsible corporate governance sees the whole policy approach as an opportunity rather 
than a challenge. Leadership requires the creation of a demand for sustainable action rather than answering 
demands for responsible action (Kuhndt et al., 2004). Some authors believe that corporate social  responsibility 
is an important regulator of corporate governance. Responsible corporate governance „is a stakeholder-oriented 
policy that allocates responsibilities to societal actors and that will drive corporate accountability” (Kuhndt et al., 
2004). Responsible corporate governance is a never-ending process, which progresses through conflicts, under 
the condition that conflicts are solved, as far as  possible, through integration and not through domination and 
compromise. Therefore, responsible corporate governance lies in entrepreneurial democracy, which 
systematically questions the organization’s mission and its relation to the common good (Aras and Crowther, 
2010). Good corporate governance therefore sets the balance between economic and social growth (Zinkin, 
2010). Contemporary experts have identified the elements of responsible corporate governance: “stakeholder 
empowered corporate governance; management and performance evaluation systems; transparency 
enhancement; accountability verification” (Kuhndt et al., 2004). Businesses characterized by responsible 
corporate governance must abide by the following principles (Kuhndt et al., 2004): „assume societal leadership 
for responsibility; clearly and specifically identify their social, environmental and economic values in 
accordance with the demands of their stakeholders; define their social, environmental  and economic priority 
areas of action; adopt specific management practices to integrate these values into their operations and take 
measurable action; disclose comprehensive data on their social, environmental and economic impacts; involve in 
comprehensive review of their activities; strive for continuous learning”. In our view, responsible corporate 
governance  can be used with direct reference to governance that is based on three important principles: fairness, 
transparency and accountability. Responsible corporate governance practices are the foundation of the 
organization's overall vision, decision-making processes  and structures that support long-term business 
sustainability. Adoption of responsible corporate governance practices is considered a voluntary act of 
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organizations (Anand et al., 2006), enabling them to generate economic, social and environmental results. 
According to this view, best practices in corporate governance require vision, processes and structures that 
ensure long-term sustainability. 
 
6. Corporate Governance environment in Croatia   
 After privatisation process started in 1991, interest in corporate governance has been raising parallel to the 
growth in private sector. Improvement in corporate governance is seen through better access to capital, 
promoting efficient performance and development, transparency compared to European requirements and rules 
and accountability. In consideration to corporate governance there is also some important issues to be mentioned, 
primarily related to the history of social ownership and all aspects of adjustments in transition period. 
Privatisation process was undergone according to the model, which was severely criticized in public and because 
of that partly cased inefficient industry sector. The weak side of privatisation model was that some enterprises 
are privatised without inflow of new capital and ex managers begun new owners without investing their own 
money. A consequence was inadequate composition of boards and in many cases performance was unproductive 
and inefficient. In Croatia managing of enterprises is regulated by Company Act following German law, while 
the Securities Law are regulated mostly against Anglo-American securities market legislation. Now, Croatia is in 
the process of reviewing all legislatives according Directives of the European Union.  Croatian system of boards 
is two-tier. Supervisory Board is responsible for monitoring enterprise leadership and thus could investigate all 
record keeping and documentation, cash etc. regarding business performance. Top Management (called 
Managerial Board or Board of Directors) are committed to inform Supervisory Board about business policies, 
profitability, income statement, liquidity etc. at least once a year. Guiding corporate strategy and corporate 
performance including interests of stakeholders is not the function of Supervisory Board. The emphasis is on 
monitoring performance through financial data and that is the main difference between Board of Directors and 
Supervisory Board. Supervisory Board members chosen by the owner have in many cases only formal role of 
monitoring and their influence on enterprise performance is disputable. In the case of mixed ownership or small 
shareholder ownership, members of Supervisory Board are chosen at the basis of skill and they are more 
accountable for efficiency performance of enterprise (Vitezi, 2003). In public enterprises Supervisory Board is 
selected upon party representation. Managerial Board main role is responsibility for running business affairs, i.e. 
business politics, profitable performance and others affairs. It consists of several members and one of them is 
chairman, usually owner. They are confirmed by Supervisory Board and could be hired or fired by them. But the 
role of Managerial Board is stronger especially in the cases where the Supervisory Board is only a formal body 
and has not much influence to the enterprises decision- making process (stated owned enterprises). Comparing to 
the recent literature on the subject (Nadler, 2004) there are different types of boards: passive, certifying, 
engaged, intervening and operating. Operating makes key decisions that other directors and managers then 
implements, and this kind of board is the most similar to the one exist in Croatia. They are responsible for 
business policies of the enterprise and in the case include the one main owner if he is the only one. The tendency 
should be on high performance board, which will be competent, coordinated, collegial and focused on an 
unambiguous goal.  With changing from social to market oriented economy many believed that these changes 
would help enterprises to gain competitive advantages and therefore contribute in increasing national efficiency. 
Privatisation is based on the premise that it will improve enterprises performance and help countries grow. But 
the effects are different on aggregate or micro level and depend on industry structure. In a cross- country 
aggregate study, Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat (2000, Vol.III) state that privatisation does not by itself increase GDP 
growth, but they suggest that a positive effect is present when privatisation is accompanied by in-depth 
institutional reforms. Applicable to Croatian economy, inflation rate is low and decreasing from 6.2 per cent in 
2000 to 2.1 in 2004. and GDP rate vary from 2.9 per cent in 2000. to 5.6 per cent in 2002, decreasing to 3.3 per 
cent in 2004. It is obvious that institutional reforms but also more important stabilization, industry restructuring, 
financial discipline and new investment are prerequisite for increasing of macroeconomic indicators. 
Additionally, privatisation force enterprises restructuring and therefore is accompanied with changes in 
management, corporate governance and organisation structure.      
 
7.  Corporate governance indicators   
 In this research corporate governance indicators are considered through some attributes of boards, particularly 
their structure, size, independence, internationalisation, diversity, frequency of meetings and others. Disclosure 
is investigated through existing information especially about board members, remuneration disclosure and 
adoption of ethics code. The results are as follows : Board structure.  In Croatia companies have two-tire system 
(as in Germany,Austria, France, etc.–in fact, only 23 percent in Europe) comprising a Supervisory board of 
outside members close to the owners, and a separate Managerial Board of executive directors. The two boards 
meet separately with strictly defined accountability under the law.Concerning board internationalisation, in 
Europe boards are more domestic with only 16 per cent of non-national directors, than the companies 
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themselves. Contrary to the surveyed companies, the percentage of foreign members (one or few) in Supervisory 
or Managerial board is higher (20.8 per cent) in Croatia.  Average ages of boards are in 68 per cent up to 45 year 
if the majority ownership is foreign, and in the rest of 31.8 per cent of enterprises are from 25 and 35 years. In 
domestic enterprises there are 82 per cent of them up to 45. Board member’s average age in Europe is 55 years. 
On average, directors have been 5.6 years on the same board what are little over than in Croatia (around 5 years). 
In the European board, the number of women increases from 6 to 7 per cent. In Croatia this percentage is much 
lower and is less than 1 per cent in Supervisory board. Only in Managerial board, women contribute with over 10 
per cent.   
Board size. The number of board size could not be considered as a factor, which determines efficient 
performance or has crucial impact to performance. There are a few reasons for explanation of this statement. 
First, board size is commonly determined by national law or listing requirements. Second, it is mostly based on 
the enterprise size and sector and therefore considered “appropriate”. Third, the knowledge of each member is 
very important for the efficiency of board decision- making. The emphasize is on effective board no matter of 
size, which means that board should be of sufficient size and the balance of skills and experience is ap to the 
requirements of the business. In Croatia the average board (Supervisory) size is five and in accordance to the law 
minimum size is 3 and maximum 21 members depending on equity amount. Croatia average is still lower than 
the minimum size in Germany (8) and Austria (6) who has the same two-tier model. This could be explained by 
the size of enterprises and structure of owners. In Croatia 95 per cent of total enterprises are small, mostly with 
no obligations to have supervisory board. Middle sized and large enterprises contribute with rest five per cent 
and in majority have one or few owners. In some research made by Čengi (2001) it is confirmed that chair 
persons of boards (Supervisory and Management) with domestic owners are in the most cases long term 
employees or managers of these firms from the period before privatisation process started. Additionally, they 
have essential influence on processes relating to the structure of Supervisory or Managerial board.Independence 
of board Croatian board name Supervisory board is not independent related to the law requirements and German 
model of two-tire board structure. Considering separation of chairman and CEO, two-tire board structure ensures 
the separation of roles. The member of the Supervisory board could not be at the same time a member of 
Managerial board.  Audit committee Beginning of the 2001, after starting accounting scandals, the role of audit 
committee has come under close scrutiny. The audit committee responsibilities are to monitor and review the 
integrity of enterprise financial statements, its internal financial controls, the external auditor’s independence and 
objectivity and the effectiveness of the audit process as a whole. Hence, the independence of audit committee is 
very important for its effectiveness. The independence of the audit committee is 64.5 per cent and varies 
considerably from minimum 4 per cent of companies with a majority independent audit committee in Japan to 
over 95 per cent in UK, Netherlands, Canada, USA, Ireland and Luxembourg (Maier, 2005).  
Disclosure.  In addition to all information company should include in disclosure, the remuneration 
policy pay attention to shareholders and others, particularly because of the relation with enterprise 
performance.Remuneration also should motivate members of boards to run the company successfully, but 
remuneration level should be determinate with contribution to the efficiency growth. Croatian enterprises mostly 
(80 per cent of them) not disclose information on the remuneration of Supervisory or Managerial board members. 
This is regarded as good practice and from the survey of 24 countries in the world  (Maier, 2005), the average of 
disclose is 84 per cent.  Comparing the frequency of board meetings with remuneration, the average 
compensation per board meeting in Europe is 7,301 EURO per 2005. (Albert- Roulhac, and Breen, 2005). In 
Croatia Company Law defines frequency of board meetings. Supervisory board is committed to have quarterly 
meetings or at least semi-yearly. The average meetings as result from questionnaire are 6. (5.8 times). The 
average in Europe countries who has two-tier board are 6.7 meetings and is notable that unitary board has more 
frequent meetings (9.3) comparing with two-tire, but also is evident continues slight increase. (Albert-Roulhac, 
and Breen, 2005). When looking for good governance practice, the implementation of code of ethics is highly 
supported. In recent years a number governmental and private initiatives have focused on the need to reduce 
corruption, bribery, fraud etc. and urged a need to improve standards of corporate governance ethics, 
transparency and integrity. In Europe in average 73 per cent of companies have a meaningful code of ethics, and 
Croatian enterprises are not much below that (70 per cent). However, existing code of ethics if not strictly 
implement could not protect against all illegal doings. 
 
8. Main types of relationships between governing and management functions in companies in 
Central European transitional economies 
Two extreme views prevail today regarding the corporate governance system (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsov,256). 
The new neo-classical school considers shareholders as the only group that governs a company. The corporate 
social responsibility school requires looking beyond the classical concept of shareholders’ wealth by suggesting 
the stakeholders’ approach. Many authors prefer to deal with the so-called outsider (USA, UK) and insider 
(Germany, Japan, other parts of Continental Europe) systems of corporate governance (Gregorič et al., 186). 
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Dispersed ownership and liquid capital markets as well as strong investors’ legal protection are an important 
assumption of the outsider corporate governance system. The strong legal protection of creditors, a highly 
concentrated ownership and relatively illiquid capital markets, as well as favouring the stakeholders’ approach 
seem to be the basic assumption of the insider system. Legal regulations can allow or forbid the concentration of 
voting rights in different countries. It is not allowed everywhere that shareholders concentrate their voting rights 
without concentrating ownership. For example, Germany and the Netherlands allow it. Banks and other financial 
companies are not allowed to be shareholders in a number of countries. The Anglo-American system does not 
allow the legal institutionalisation of the employee right to share ownership or profit in companies (the right to 
economic democracy) (Zalar, 37).One can find an autonomous corporation surrounded by markets in an Anglo-
American environment on one hand, and on the other hand, business groups as a typical constellation of 
corporations, mostly with the financial corporation in the centre, in Continental and Northern Europe (Collin & 
Ceslajs,163). Taking into account all the stated differences, one can better understand the logic and distinctive 
features of the outsider and insider corporate governance systems that we frequently deal with as the Anglo-
American and German governance models (Rozman,103). These two models can also be seen as a one-tier and a 
two-tier model.   
The Anglo-American corporate governance system is based on: 
 The organisation of a large independent corporation 
 A board of directors that is quite independent regarding its shareholders and stakeholders 
 Corporations situated in environments characterised by strong financial markets and small government 
intervention 
 A competitive culture 
 A legal system that discourages ownership by banks and other financial organisations. 
The model consists of two governance bodies: the shareholders’ assembly and the board of directors. Members 
of the board of directors are insiders and outsiders. The board has two main tasks: 1) controlling the business 
results and 2) controlling strategic decisions.  
The German (Continental European) model is based on (Collin  & Cesljas, 167): 
 Business group systems that dominate in the economy 
 Weak financial markets 
 A strong government intervention 
 A rather co-operative or authoritarian culture 
 Close connections between corporations and financial organisations. 
The model incorporates three governing bodies: 1) the shareholders’ assembly, 2) the supervisory board, and 3) 
the board of directors. Representatives of employees are also members of the supervisory board. Members of the 
board of directors cannot be outsiders. The main tasks of the supervisory board are to hire and fire the board of 
directors and to supervise the company’s business performance. Mainly the law determines the role of the 
corporate governance function. 
European transitional countries were able to choose between the stated two governance models. Central 
European countries chose mainly a variant of the German model. However, Russian reformers opted for the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsov, 250). E.g., the Republic of 
Macedonia’s Law on Trade Companies introduced a solution that allows both the one-tier and two-tier models 
(Drakulevski,1132). The Commercial Code determined the corporate governance model in Poland. Its main 
characteristics are derived from the German model. The shareholders’ assembly, the supervisory board, and the 
board of directors are characteristic of the two-tier system. Slovenia and Croatia introduced similar systems. The 
German model applied and the still existing wide dispersion of ownership in Central European transitional 
countries enable top managers to behave rather independently and to hold major power in their hands. The 
described governance power distribution is quite typical for large domestically privatised companies nowadays. 
In the pre-transition period, the governance power was with external owners (governments mostly). The 
privatisation of large, state-owned companies brought mainly dispersed ownership of large, domestically 
privatised enterprises, and thus the governance power has been transferred to executive managers (slightly more 
so in companies with a dominant share of internal owners than in those with a dominant share of external owners) 
(See Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Changing patterns of the governance power distribution in domestically privatised large companies in 
Central European transition economies 
 
9. Conclusion 
The role of corporate governance is manifested in: creating value for the corporation and supporting 
transparency (Lamm, 2010b); protecting shareholders' rights and ensuring their equal treatment, acknowledging 
the interests of all entities that develop relationships with the company, assuming responsibility by the Board of  
Directors, integrity and ethical  behaviour, transparency in implementing internal and external  control systems 
to certify the validity of corporate financial reports (Dobrotă, et al., 2011). 
The corporate governance function provokes reconsideration everywhere today. We do not believe that 
a uniform corporate governance model will be appropriate for all countries, neither for all transitional countries. 
Historical, cultural, economic and political realities have strong influences on its suitability. In spite of this fact, 
different models will certainly have many common characteristics and they are worth being identified. The 
modest accumulated experiences with the governing practices in Central European transitional countries and 
their analysis can identify the main directions for the future development of corporate governance models in this 
part of Europe. The analysis shows that we need to further develop the stakeholders’ governance model that will 
not deny the central role of owners’ interests in corporate governance. On the other hand, the owners’ interests 
should not be the only ones that are incorporated in the corporate governance process. The corporate governance 
function must start to look beyond just the shareholders’ wealth creation. Knowledge-based industries demand 
highly knowledgeable employees that invest and risk much in providing their expert knowledge. Their 
remuneration is high enough that they are able to accept variable pay systems linked to corporate financial 
performance. They are, therefore, the most important group of stakeholders, beyond owners, entitled to 
participate in corporate governance. We do not see that on this base a workers’ self-management system of 
corporate governance has to be developed. The dominant power within corporate governance has to be balanced 
according to the level of risk that individual stakeholders take over. We believe that investors in companies will 
be those who will carry the biggest risk still for an extended period of time in transitional countries because 
domestic capital is still a very scarce resource in these environments.  
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